C H A P T E R 1 7 IS SURROGACY ETHICALLY PROBLEMATIC?

LESLIE FRANCIS
RISKS ot exploitation in surrogacy, especially commercial surrogacy, are impressive, as eloquently documented by Donna Dickenson in this volume. Many commentators also have written about potential harms to the chi ld when gestation is achieved through surrogacy-from commodification in apparent baby selling, to unsafe pregnancy con ditions, to unfit parents or parents with abusive conceptions of who or what they want their child to be. 1 Concerns have also been raised about the frequency with which appar ently voluntary commercial surrogacy is really a form of trafficking, either of the sur rogate or of the child . This chapter will assume that exploitation and its extreme form in trafficking, as well as these forms of harm to the child, are wrongs to be av oided in anv permissible surrogacy. If a sur rogacy practice inevitably incorporates or cre ates serious risks of these wrongs, the practice would be wrong. But supposing these harms do not actually exist or could be left aside, is surrogacy itself ethically permissible? Are there ethical reasons to question all surrogacy, even noncommercialized, uncoerced, and altruistic arrangements among family members?
This chapter takes up less well-trodden questions 2 about whether a surrogacy arrangement in which one person carries a pregnancy for another is ethically problem atic in itself-and if so, why. Pregnancy and delivery are quintessential bodily labor.
One set of arguments tests whether carrying a pregnancy is the type of bodily labor one person ethically may perform for another, whether or not for pay. These ar guments contend that surrogacy cannot be a permissible service, no matter how well intended or structured. Another set of questions probes the value and identity of the child, ask ing whether surrogacy is inevitably akin to baby selling or, if not, devalues the child in some other way. A final set of related questions attends to whether surrogacy properly respects the relationship between the pregnant woman and the child-to-be. The gene ral strategy of the argument is to show that we cannot reject all surrogacy on any of these grounds without also rejecting other practices that we find acceptable. 7he conclusion is that although there are ser ious ethical issues about surrogacy arrangements, they ca n be allayed by how these arrangements are structured and are far outweighed by the inter ests of inf ertile individuals or couples in becoming parents.
Most surrogacy today is "gestational" surrogacy, in which neither the surrogate nor her partner contributes the gametes to be used in the pregnancy. I a ddress this torm of surrogacy primarily 3 but begin with some remarks about "traditional surrogacy, because it initiated the practice and has to some extent continued to frame the debates.
TRADITIONAL AND GESTATIONAL SURROGACY
Surrogacy exploded onto the legal scene in the 1988 N ew Jersey case of Baby ,\/. 4 In this case, Mary Beth Whitehead was the genetic and gestational mother of the child; William
Stern was the child's genetic father; and William and Elizabeth Stern were the child's intended rearing parents. The pregnancy was achieved by artificial insemination using sperm from William Stern. The surrogacy contract provided that Whitehead was to be paid $10,000 for gestation of the child and doing whatever was necessary to terminate her maternal rights so that Elizabeth Stern would be able to adopt the child. Mary Beth Whitehead's husband was also a party to the contract; he agreed to do whatever was necessary to rebut presumptions of paternity under state law. After the baby's birth, Whitehead became emotionally distraught and sought to keep the child; Stern brought suit to enforce the surrogacy contract. The New Jersey Supreme Court ultimately con cluded that the surrogacy contract violated the public policy of the state, using instruc tive reasoning.
Core to the court's reasoning was New Jersey's adoption statute. That statute prohib ited money payments in exchange for an adoption and imposed strict requirements on the relinquishment of parental rights, which was not permitted until after the child's birth. The court determined that the surrogacy arrangement employed private con tract law to circumvent these restrictions of the adoption statute. In the court's view, the money was being paid to obtain an adoption and not for personal services, despite provisions in the contract reciting that it was for services. Moreover, the contract was necessarily coercive because it created an irrevocable agreement, prior to birth or even conception, for the surrender of any resulting child, also not permitted for private adop tions under New Jersey state law. Adoption is for h umanitarian purposes, the court said; in contrast, the surrogacy arrangement between William Stern and the Whiteheads was an economic arrangement "without regard to the interest of the child or the natural mother." 5
Several themes stand out in the court's critique of contractual surrogacy. The first is that carrying a chi ld for an other is not an o rdinary service that can be the subject of o rdi nary contract law. The second is that the woman carrying the child as its ge netic and ges tational mother is the child's "natural" mother. This r elationship can only be terminated was genetic, Anna's gestational; in that sense both had claims to a maternal relation ship with the child. According to the court, California law provided no basis for choos ing between the two; thus, the court examined the terms of the surrogacy agreement to establish intended parenthood. According to the court; "although the Act recognizes both genetic consanguinity and giving birth as means of es tablishing a mother and child relationship, when the two means do not coincide in one woman, she who intended to procreate the child-that is, she who intended to bring about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as he r own-is the natural mother under California law." 8
Like the New Jersey court, the California court uses the language of "natural" moth
erhood to describe what is also a legal choice-that is, the identification of the legal mother. Unlike New Jersey, however, California contends that the surrogate would not have been able to conceive the child in question without the intentions of the planned parents. The gestational mother is "agreeing to provide a necessary and profoundly important service without (by definition) any expectation that she will raise the result ing child as her own." 9 The arrangement could be fully voluntary, as at the time of con tracting Anna was not expected to "part with her own expected offspring." 10 The court also opined that it is unlikely that prospective parents would choose to procreate in this way without taking the ch ild's interests as ce ntral.
Perhaps the difference between the New Jersey and California courts' analyses hinges on the difference between traditional and gestational surrogacy. Gestational surrogacy may involve a biological relationship between the intended mother and the child that traditional surrogacy does not, the genetic tie; with traditional surrogacy, the intended mother bears no biological relationship with her prospective child. Of course, ges tational surrogacy also may involve the use of third-party gametes, in which case nei ther the surrogate nor the intended mother is a source of the child's genetic makeup.
Subsequent case law in New Jersey does reflect consideration of suc h genetic ties, at least to some extent. In a case decided in 2000, a sister carried an embryo created from the sperm of her brother-in-law and the egg of her sister who was unable to carry a preg nancy. The intended parents (with the surrogate's agreement) petitioned for a prebirth order to have the birth certificate list them as the child's parents. Bowing to the postbirth right of the surrogate not to relinquish the child for adoption for 72 hours after b irth, the court refused to issue the requested prebirth order. To support this conclusion, the court relied on the emotional ties created by pregnancy: the intended parents' "simplistic comparison to an incubator disregards the fact that there are human emotions and bio logical changes involved in pregnancy." 11 However, as the window for relinquishment ot parental rights opened before the birth certificate needed to be filed at 5 days after birth, the court issued an order permitting the certificate to be changed before filing to list the intended parents as the child's parents, on condition that the gestational mother agree to relinquish her rights to the child. In a later decision, however, the New Jersey courts declined to extend this strategy to a case of gestational surrogacy in which the parties used a donated egg, so that the intended mother bore no biological relationship to the child and the gestational mother bore only a gestational relationship. 11 would prohibit any rescue that risks the life of the rescuer (no matter how small the risk to save another from serious but nonfatal harm. Another such judgment might be that reproduction is not a sufficiently important service, but this defense devalues reproduc tive bodily services in a manner that remains to be argued.
Indeed, we regard as ethically permissible other forms of physical labor for others that are quite risky. Nursing is an e xample. Over a third of nurses suffer debilitating back injuries primarily attributable to repetitive lifting and transferring of patients (Brown 2003) . Residential care workers have similarly high rates of injury (Harris 2013 ). These injury rates are far beyond those associated with normal pregnancy and birth. Although many lifts and transfers are performed to avoid morbidity such as sores, others are for quality of life reasons such as a nursing home patients ability to have meals with others or go outside. Many family members also perform these tasks in order to enable loved ones to remain at home and in the community; although I k now of no data studying familial injury rates, presumably they would be at least similar to those ot trained pro fessionals performing the same service, likely with better equipment.
Another more limited way to argue against surrogacy as a service is to argue that it is a special form of bodily labor for another that ought not to be compensated but that might permissibly be performed altruistically. As in the example ot the New Jersey case described above, intrafamilial surrogacy arrangements or close-friend arrangements may be desirable for some infertile couples (ESHRE Task Force 2011). Implementing this approach are laws prohibiting commercial surrogacy but allowing uncompensated arrangements. 14 This is only an objection to commercialized forms ot surrogacy, how ever; uncompensated surrogacy would remain permissible (as in many countries ot the world), unless it is inevitably tied to commercial surrogacy. However, examining arguments offered against commercial surrogacy presents the opportunity to consider whether they extend to noncommercial surrogacy as well.
COMPENSATED SURROGACY
Many jurisdictions prohibit paid surrogacy while permitting supposedly uncompen sated versions of the practice. Although my primary focus is the ethics of unpaid sur rogacy, examining issues abou t paid surrogacy can be re vealing about unpaid surrogacy.
A threshold problem with drawing the commercial/noncommercial line is the dif ficulty in distinguishing commercial from purely uncompensated forms ot surrogacy van Zyl and Walker 2013). Although there no doubt are arrangements in which the sur rogate receives no fo rm of payment, many surrogacies-including those in jurisdictions that do not permit paid surrogacy-compensate for expenses the surrogate would not otherwise have incurred but for the gest ation. These typically include medical expenses, maternity clothes (and perhaps new clothes post birth), compensation for lost wages, and other expenses associated with the pregnancy. Of note, these pregnancy-related expenses are so significant that it would arguably be unfair to the surrogate to expect her to bear them on her own. 1 ' 1 Moreover, pregnancies do go awry at times, and it would seem especially unfair not to provide a surrogate with insurance against unexpected medical expenses.
Recognizing these issues in distinguishing commercial from noncommercial sur rogacy, van Zyl and Walker (2013) argue that neither fully commercialized models nor fully altruistic models are appropriate for understanding the practice. As another reason for rejecting the purely altruistic paradigm, these authors also contend that it fa ils to take into account the reciprocal obligations parties in a surrogacy arrangement have to one another; for example, the surrogate has obligations to take care during the preg nancy and the intended parents have obligations to treat the surrogate with respect. In assessing paid surrogacy, it is worth noting that we do allow some intimate activi ties for others to be compensated, so it can not be the intimacy alone that explains oppo sition to c ompensation. Assistants are paid to wash, bathe, feed, and perform bowel care
tor people who cannot achieve these functions independently. While families often take primary roles in performing these functions-and desire to perform such caregiving functions out of love-on many views they are neither obligated to do this nor thought less of because they rely on help from others who are paid for their work (e.g., Levine 2005) . Wet nursing as a social practice historically was identified with infant abandon ment or with aristocratic women handing off tasks they regarded as unpleasant to the poor, but today it has garnered increased interest in light of evidence about the negative health effects of fo rmula feeding (Stevens, Patrick, and Pickler 2009 Further reasons offered for viewing surrogacy as special in a way that precludes com mercialization rest in accounts of the surrogates own flourishing, the identity of the child, or the desirability of preserving certain forms of parent-child relationships. Two early and powerful criticisms of surrogacy-by Margaret Jane Radin and by Elizabeth
Anderson-both developed arguments that performing this particular kind of intimate bodily labor for another is i nconsistent with the pregnant woman's own flourishing.
Writing before the transition from traditional to gestational surrogacy, both authors addressed commercial forms of traditional surrogacy primarily, but with arguments that have more general import.
In her seminal article about commodification of intimate activities, Margaret lane Radin (1987) defended a view of market-inalienability rooted in human flourishing. On her account, the dividing line between permissible and impermissible commodification lies in core aspects of pe rsonhood, freedom, and identity, set in context. Freedom is the power to choose for oneself, and identity is the continuing integrity of the selt that is necessary for individuation; these interact in the context of environments in which per sons seek to constitute themselves. Surrogacy (along with baby selling and prostitution)
should not be subject to purchase and sale in an ideal world, Radin concludes, because they alienate important personal attributes and relationships (p. 1904) . A complication for a nonideal world is that some forms of at least partial commodification may be tol erated to avoid even worse injustices. Commercialized sex is problematic because sex should be "freely shared," not engaged in only if the parties believe it i s economically worthwhile. However, there may be nonideal contexts in which selling sex is the best of very bad options for otherwise impoverished or oppressed women. By contrast, babies are not fungible; to sell th em is deny their individual identity (p. 1908) and is never ethi cally permissible, even in the worst of c ontexts.
Surrogacy, Radin thinks, is a more difficult case for a nonideal world, but she con cludes that reproductive services should be market-inalienable even in contexts in which women have few other choices. Her reasoning is that to sell these services is to alienate a core aspect of identity. Much of her concern lies with commercialization, of both child and gestating mother, but some of what she says applies also to surrogacy in which the gestation is not commercialized. In particular, she deploys her understand ing of identity to query whether the gestating woman is regarded as a fungible source of something-the child-produced to satisfy the needs or wants of others. Still worse,
Radin says, what the surrogate does is embedded in gender hierarchy, at least in tra ditional surrogacy, where the goal is the father's but not the intended mother's genetic child: she is expected to give up her own child, and the intended infertile mother is expected to raise someone else's child, all to satisfy the intended father's desire for a genetic heir (pp. 1929-1930) . These points-that the surrogate's body is being used to satisfy the wants of ano ther, and that the desire for a surrogate-borne child (that may or may not be genetically related) is ineluctably gendered-apply even to noncommercial forms of th e practice, on Radin's view.
Along similar lines, Elizabeth Anderson (1990) These points do not take fully into account the possibility that many surrogacy choices arise out of such complex circumstances and emotions that they should be regarded with suspicion. For example, Fabre cites data to the effect that surrogates most frequently enter into the arrangement out of a complexity of emotions, includ ing guilt over prior abortions and other "mistakes" (2006, p. 192) . If so, this would pro vide a reason for concern about whether surrogacy can be seen as evincing appropriate self-respect, or as manifesting problematic self-blame. Other data indicate that the most likely motivation for surrogacy is the altruistic desire to give parenthood to others ladva et al. 20 03). Here, too, h owever, there are concerns about whether in intrafamilial arrangements subtle forms of coercion might be operative; for example, a fertile sister might feel guilty about her ability to reproduce when confronted with the pain of a sis ter who cannot (ESHRE Task Eorce 2011). Surely these pressures are operative in some surrogacy decisions; whether they are operative in sufficient numbers to say that the practice is unethical is another matter. Moreover, careful counseling can identify many cases of inappropriate pressures, even if some may remain. In assessing the evidence about the likelihood that surrogates are not choosing freely, care must be taken not to assume that reproductive choices must be irrational or subject to emotions so strong as to overwhelm choice.
A related argument made by surrogacv's critics is that the surrogate fails to recog nize the inevitable emotional ties resulting from gestation. Some claims about these ties were hypothesized before gestational surrogacy's replacement of traditional surrogacy.
But even with gestational surrogacy, surely the biological changes associated with preg nancy and birth will generate emotional reactions. It is an empirical matter what forms these emotions are likely to take, how severe they are likely to be, or whether they are likely to interfere with the surrogate's subsequent life to an extent that suggests that sur rogacy is wrong. One recent (albeit small) study indicates that although the immedi ate postbirth period is difficult, surrogates do not show signs of depression or reduced self-esteem 10 years after birth (Jadva, Imrie, and Golombok 2014) . Moreover, surro gates frequently maintain contact with the intended parents and offspring to an extent that they find satisfying. Arguing that the emotional reactions of pregnancy must be s o strong or manifested in a parent-child relationship-so that surrogacy is inconsistent with self-respect-would appear at best a risky strategy for feminists who want to avoid essentialist commitments about the nature of wo men's emotions.
Another freedom-based concern is that surrogacy contracts may be structured to commit the woman to relinquish the child before birth, or even before pregnancy has been achieved. Critics argue that this precommitment does not respect the woman's lib erty to change her mind about a very important life event. Some contend that women even when they believe they have completed their own families may not be able to a ntic ipate the emotions they will feel upon being expected to surrender the child they have borne after birth, and so should not be committed to this until after the child's arrival.
On this view, no surrogacy contracts could be enforceable unless they provide a win dow of choice postpartum for the surrogate to decide whether to relinquish her paren tal rights. These arguments against precommitment were developed when traditional surrogacy was the primary form of the practice; it is u nderstandable that women with genetic ties to the child might feel differently about relinquishment than women with out genetic ties as would be the case with gestational surrogacy, as is also illustrated in the case of ad option.
In assessing surrogacy arrangements involving prebirth commitments, it is useful to ask whether surrogacy contracts are unique in the likelihood of subsequent regret, or whether there are other proposed contracts that are judged impermissible because of their unanticipated emotional burdens when the time comes for enforcement. Several doctrines in contract law might be analytically helpful here (see Fabre 2006, pp. 215-216) . On a theory of unilateral mistake, contracts are voidable if one party held a mis taken belief at the time the contract was entered, that party does not bear the risk of the mistake under the contract, and either enforcement of the contract would be uncon scionable or th e other party had reason to know of the mistake at the ti me of co ntracting or was at fault for the mistake. 2 ' Typ ical cases of unilateral mistake are sales in which the seller was grossly in error about the nature of the item sold and seeks to undo the deal. In surrogacy, the mistake would be the surrogate's belief about her future feelings about relinquishing the child and the judgment that enforcement of the contract would be unconscionable would be based on the surrogate's attachment to the child. Cases in which contracts are v oidable for unilateral mistake are very unusual, however, given the aim of contract law to introduce stability into exchange relationships. If surrogacv is different, perhaps the conclusion to be drawn is that surrogate contracts lacking a post partum window should be unenforceable as unconscionable. This introduces an ele ment of un certainty into any s urrogacy agreement, although in the vast majority of ca ses the arrangement will conclude as planned. In any event, a determination that freedom requires this limitation on surrogacy contracts is not a n argument against surrogacy, but only for structuring surrogacy contracts to give surrogates the liberty to change their minds within a postpartum window.
Yet another reason for rejecting surrogacy is the judgment that surrogacy expresses the wrong sort of regard for ones reproductive capacities. On this view, the surrogate sees her reproductive capacities as so mething to be used to produce a child tor someone else rather than for her own parenting. It would be question begging to argue that sur rogacy is wrong because it is wrong to use ones reproductive capacities tor anotherwhether or not this use is wrong is exactly what is at issue. Radin, Anderson, and other writers argue that reproduction is alienated if the child is for another; the idea here is that reproduction must be linked to the intention to parent (even though there are cir cumstances such as wartime, privation, or disease in which it seems unlikely that the intention will come to fruition). For example, Stuart Oultram writes that "women who donate eggs arguably do so in an alienated way in so much as they donate to assist others rather than because they want to become parents themselves" (2015, p. 472). Christine
Overall advances a similar point in arguing that surrogacy demonstrates inadequate levels of care for the child: "it must be acknowledged that the gestating woman creates the baby not because she wants it for its own sake but precisely in order to give it away; so her caring certainly has strict limits (2015, p. 354). A nd Carole Pateman (1988) argues that surrogacy is wrong because it detaches women from their reproductive identities. Now, powerful reasons for linking reproduction to the intention to parent are pro tection of the resulting child or the parent-child relationship. It is unclear, however, why the parenting intention or the parent-child relation must lie between the gestating woman and the child she bears, and not between the child and the intended parents notably even in cases in which they are the genetic parents of the child, having contrib uted the gametes used in in vitro fertilization, or in which neither the surrogate nor the intended parents are genetically related to the child because conception was achieved with a donated embryo). In any event, subsequent sections will take up regard for the child and regard for the parent-child relationship. Here, the issue is why reproduction would be problematic because it is not linked to the gestating woman's own intention to parent and it is hard to see what an answer would be that is not simply a rejection of surrogacy.
A final possibility is that in becoming a surrogate, a woman compromises her own ability to have a meaningful conception of her good. Conceptual claims to this effect might be that having a child for another cannot be part of a meaningful conception of the good, or that intending to parent a child one bears must be part of a meaningful conception of one's go od. But it is hard to see w hy these claims are not question begging.
Empirical versions of this concern would be that surrogacy is such a commitment that it precludes other activities that are critical to a meaningful conception of one's good.
If surrogacy compromised women's later capabilities to form partnerships or families, or reduced the likelihood of surrogates pursuing educations or satisfying careers, this would indeed be a weighty concern. But there are ways of select ing surrogates that blunt this objection. Surrogacy could be limited to women who have already had children or to those whose partners consent-although either of these limits might themselves be regarded as impermissible restrictions on reproductive liberty. Moreover, many women become surrogates because they believe that surrogacy will further their conceptions of their good. With commercial surrogacy, women may engage in the practice to provide more than they would otherwise be able to for their own children, or to stay at home with their children rather than entering the workforce in other ways. Some women become surrogates in order to pay for their educations. To be sure, care must be taken that these arrangements are not exploitative. But in practice there surely are co ntexts in which surrogacy does not detract from and even furthers the surrogate's well-formed conception of her go od.
Surrogacy s criti cs also argue that the practice is inevitably gendered, as it imposes the male intended parent's preferences on the surrogate or c ompels his partner to raise another's child. This objection, if it has purchase at all, applies most clearly to situations such as the Baby M case in which the traditional surrogate is artificially inseminated with the intended father's sperm. Many surr ogate pregnancies today involve the gametes of the intended parents or gametes from unrelated donors. In such cases, the gen etic tie to the child may be as important to the female partner as to the male. Surrogacy is also a reproductive option for same-sex couples wanting to become parents through means other than adoption. Although surely some pregnancies and some surrogate pregnan cies involve gendered pressures to have "his" child, it is by no m eans necessary for all or many surrogate pregnancies to do so. It would see m particularly odd to make this argu ment in the cases in which a woman's oocyte and donated sperm are used, or gametes from neither intended parent are used, or the intended parents are a same-sex couple.
At most, the concerns about gender hierarchy seem applicable to surrogacy using sperm from the male intended parent but donated oocytes, as might be the case for older cou ples seeking to become parents. But this would yield the odd result: that surrogacy is ethically problematic in just the case in which gametes of the male intended parent are used. A far more reasonable position is to screen and counsel surrogates and intended parents to do the best to assure that the choices of all parties are genuinely made in a manner free fro m pressure.
SURROGACY: THE CHILD'S INTERESTS AND IDENTITY
Surrogacy is about assisting in the creation of a baby for anoth er. Many objections to sur rogacy contend that it is "baby selling." In noncommercial surrogacy, these objections do not hold, but other concerns about the baby may apply. Before turning to these other objections, however, it is important to unpack what might be the subject of sale in com mercial surrogacy. Here are some possibilities: the child, rights of the child, rights over the child, or gestational services. It is generally agreed that the sale ot a human being by another human being is wrong: it treats the person as a c ommodity, violates the person's freedom and dignity, and likely subjects the person to oppression or worse. It also treats persons as fun gible commodities, exchangeable for o ther commodities with more desir able characteristics if the price is right. Children are not fungible commodities and must not be treated as such, either by the producing surrogate or by the intended parents.
Fabre draws the conclusion that the surrogate must regard the child as more than an object with exchange value, as must the receiving parents. This regard, she thinks, dif ferentiates surrogacy from the case of a celebrity couple having a baby to sell it t o the highest bidder, or of pa rents deciding to put an older child up tor bids.
But if we distinguish such sales regarding the person as a fungible commodity-in which there is a paid transfer of all rights and duties over the person as object-from the sale of m ore particular rights of or o ver the person (Fabre 2006, p. 190 ; Hanna 2010J, whether these other forms of sale are objectionable is more complex. Parenthetically, example-are subject to sal e at the di scretion of th e person. Other rights-liberty rights, rights to be a property owner, or rights to nondiscrimination-are judged on many political theories not to be al ienable in this way. Co mmercial surrogacy presses whether the child's right to particular parents could be subject to sale. But a core question about surrogacy is whether the ch ild has a right to be raised by a gestational parent-or instead whether genetic or social ties are the basis for the child's right to be parented by the persons with those ties. From the claim that the child has a right to be parented, or the weaker claim that the child has a right to be assured that his or her needs will be met and that she will be afforded the opportunities requisite for a meaningful life, it does not fol low that the child has a right to be pa rented by her gestational parent. It would, of course, follow that the child's rights to adequate parenting, welfare, or opportunities must be protected in any surrogacy arrangement and that surrogacy arrangements without such protections are im permissible.
An additional complication about the child's rights is that children cannot act for themselves. This complication does not mean that rightsof the child cannot be alienated, but it does mean that any alienation must be subject to conditions that protect the inter ests of the child and that hold open critically important choices for the child to make at a later time to the extent possible (e.g., Davis 1997 , Feinberg 1980 , Mills 2003 . To be per missible, surrogacy arrangements must respect these constraints. In this regard, there is an important dispute about whether children should be told the circumstances of their conception or gestation, including information about the identity of gamete donors or surrogates. This issue is considered by Glenn Cohen's contribution to this volume.
In commercial surrogacy, another possible object of sale is the gestating parent's parental rights over the child. Elizabeth Anderson, for example, has argued that paren tal rights of genetic parents should not be bought or sold (1990, p. 79) . In considering whether selling these rights is objectionable, it is worth noting that some sales of rights over persons may be permissible, depending on the context and the rights in question.
Although most political philosophies agree it is wrong for persons to sell themselves into slavery, or to be sold into slavery, it is not so clear that it is wrong for people to buy themselves out of slavery or for others to do so on their behalf, thus extinguishing the rights of slaveholders. (Of course, this would only be an issue in partial compliance theory, as slavery itself is wrong.) Radin contends that it is wrong for parents to sell their rights to a child, because it is in effect selling the child (1987, p. 1904) . But this raises the question whether sale of these particular rights over a child treats the child as an obiect of sale; I have argued earlier that it need not do so if the rights and interests of the child are protected.
"let another possibility is that it wrongs the gestational parent for her parental rights to be subject to sale. Surely it does when the circumstances of sale are coercive, but it is a different question whether it does so in other cases. The preceding section argued that the sale of gestational services is not a wrong to the surrogate if it occurs in a context in which she is adequately protected. Such sales need not interfere with her libertv, her integrity, or her ability to lead a meaningful life if they are structured in ways that protect her adequately. Leaving for the next section whether commercial surrogacy appropri ately respects the parent-child relationship, similar reasoning can be applied to the sale of parental rights.
A further question is whether the gestational surrogate has parental rights to sell or to gi\e away in the first place. Why parental rights should attach exclusively or at all to t e gestational parent is itself at issue in surrogacy. Elizabeth Anderson argued about tra itional surrogacy that a consent-intent" conceptualization of parenthood-that t ie intended parents are the possessors of parental rights-makes parenthood arbitrary, nstea , s e argues for recognition of genetic ties as determinative of parenthood: in recognizing these ties, she says, "we help to secure children's interests in having an assure p ace in the world, which is more firm than the wills of their parents ... it]
oes not make the obligation to care for those whom one has created (intentionally , , cont ' n 8 ent upon an arbitrary desire to do so" (1990, p. 79) . This view, however, she ;,r r ental "^t s in t{le surro gate on ly when she is the genetic parent, which the intP 71 & m CaSeS °f gestational surrogacy where the genetic parents will either be tal riphJ 1 6 ^3 rentS 0r d°n ors -It would seem implausible to assume that vesting parenminatinn 7 i' S W '" most P rote chve of children. This suggests that the deterw lere to locate parental rights is a normative choice, constructed rather than determined by some "natural" feature such as gestation or genetics. For a variety of historical reasons, among them identifying stable sources of parenting for children, legal regimes have identified gestating women and their partners during gestation as the legal parents of the child, but there is nothing inevitable about this location. On the other side of gestational parenting is the argument that the failure to recognize the role of the intended parent devalues the role of persons in initiating reproductive projects Robertson 1996; see also Oultram 2015) .
In addition to stable parenting and protection of the child's interests, another issue that has been raised about surrogacy is the child's identity. Understanding identity is far beyond the scope of this discussion, but it should be noted briefly that there are many different accounts of id entity not at all linked to genetics or gestation. Especially impor tant here are views of identity as soc ial (e.g., Appiah 2014 Appiah ,2005 . Such accounts may link identity to nation, culture, race, sex, disability, or religion, among other social construc tions. To h old that children's identity is violated if their genetic parents do n ot raise them is to ignore the complexity of these matters. And it is also, of course, to re ject any repro duction in which gamete donation plays a part, as well a s adoption. Children need iden tities, but it is far from clear that these must be identities constructed by their genetic parents.
THE RELATIONSHIP OF GESTATING
A final set of criticisms of surrogacy claims that it h as a mistaken view of the parentchild relationship. The surrogate interacts with the baby in carrying it, these critics argue, and this relationship is not respected if the child is given away. In this respect, pregnancy is a un ique form of labor. Overall writes: "The situation of a pr egnant woman is radically different from the situation of a factory worker. 'Ike factory worker brings only his skill and labor to the factory; he does not provide the materials on which he labors or the environment in which he labors. The pregnant woman, on the other hand, is, herself, the environment in which her reproductive labor is performed. She also provides the materials out of which the child is created" (Overall 2015, p. 357) . Earlier sections of this chapter have considered the interests of th e surrogate and the child sepa rately; the view to be explored here is that the pregnancy itself creates a relationship that is not properly respected by relinquishment of the child. On this view, there must be overriding reasons-such as the in capacity ofgestators-to warrant sundering this rela tionship, but these reasons do not obtain in surrogacy.
But why should gestation be regarded as ethically weighty in this way? To be sure, 9 months of interaction with a fetus (assuming the pregnancy is carried to term) has effects on the woman's body and emotions that must be taken into account. And the child in utero has experiences, too; there is evidence that after birth children respond in particular ways to prebirth experiences. These facts may be taken to have meta physical significance, as Hilde Lindemann (this volume) explores. But whether these FRANCIS 
